



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

BRIEF MENTION.

Mr. E. C. MARCHANT, whose intelligent interest in Greek syntax is abundantly manifest in his *Andokides* and his various contributions to the *Classical Review*, has recently put forth an edition of the *Second Book of Thucydides* (New York, Macmillan & Co.), which is ominously dedicated to Dr. Rutherford, whose critical methods he admires and imitates. It would be as useless at this late day to lift up a voice against Rutherford's 'double Dutch'¹ criticism as it would be cruel to add another stone to the cairn that has been heaped over his first edition of Herondas, and so, for the present at least, I pass by Mr. Marchant's treatment of the text of Thucydides to pause for a moment on some of his grammatical notes. One of them has already borne fruit, and in a little book entitled *Rules and Exercises in Greek Conditional and Relative Sentences*, Mr. G. S. FARNELL, otherwise a devoted follower of Goodwin, departs from his guide in obedience to Mr. Marchant's dictum, contained in the *Classical Review* for July, 1890, p. 320, and repeated in his note to Thuc. 2, 2, 4. "In a protasis to a condition in *oratio obliqua*, probably only the future indicative is ever changed into optative, so that the optative in protasis in *or. obl.*, except with the future, represents either *ἦν* and subj. or *εἰ* and opt. of the Recta." This is, of course, in direct contradiction to M. and T., §689, 3, 2, where Goodwin gives perfectly cogent examples from Xenophon, Hell. 5, 2, 32 and An. 6, 6, 25, to which he might have added Oec. 9, 18. For this rule Mr. Marchant frankly acknowledges his indebtedness to Stahl. In his *Quaestiones grammaticae ad Thucydidem pertinentes* (2 ed., 1886) that distinguished scholar lays down the canon for Thucydides that *εἰ* with the opt. in *oratio obliqua* must represent either an original *εἰ* with the opt. or *ἐάν* with the subj., and says that the same canon applies to Greek generally, the only exception being the fut. opt. The reason given for this exception is that *εἰ* with fut. opt. is open to no such ambiguity as would arise if *εἰ* with the opt. of *oratio obliqua* could represent *εἰ* with the ind. of present and perfect. But a certain amount of ambiguity is inevitable even in these *oratio obliqua* *εἰ*'s with the opt., as Stahl himself acknowledges by allowing a choice in the resolution between *εἰ* with opt. and *ἐάν* with the subj., and the avoidance of that ambiguity by the retention of the *oratio recta* construction is not a matter of grammatical correctness, but a norm of style, and belongs to the general category of *repraesentatio*. Thucydides, as is well known, leans to *repraesentatio*, Xenophon leans the other way, and hence most of the examples cited are from Xenophon. Indeed, if one could trust a recent work by JOOST, *Was ergibt sich aus dem Sprachgebrauch Xenophons in der Anabasis für die Behandlung der griechischen Syntax in der Schule?* (Berlin, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung), p. 237, Xenophon uses the

¹ M. Rutherford qui a beaucoup pratiqué les philologues hollandais, fera bien de méditer le proverbe *to out-herod Herod*. Il ne faut pas qu'on lui reproche de *out-cobet Cobet*. T. R., Revue des études grecques, III 11, p. 335.

oratio obliqua opt. for the logical condition with great freedom, but most of Joost's examples show that he has an utter lack of right conception, and of his 21 instances, all but a few fall away. Still, examples enough remain unshaken to enable us to understand why Mr. Marchant is constrained to except Xenophon. As has been said, we should expect Thukydides to prefer the indicative in the dependent logical condition, and we are not surprised to find that the only two *ei*'s with the fut. opt. (6, 30, 2; 6, 34, 5) may fairly be considered interrogative. See A. J. P. XIII 124. But what of 8, 92, 3?: *οὐκ ἔφη ὁ Θηραμένης εἰκὸς εἶναι ἐπ' Εὐβοίαν πλεούσας αὐτὰς ἐς Αἰγίαν κατακολπίσαι καὶ πάλιν ἐν Ἐπιδαύρῳ ὀρμεῖν, εἰ μὴ παρακληθεῖσαι ἡκοιεν ἐφ' οἷσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς ἀεὶ κατηγορεῖ.* Here the condition must be *εἰ μὴ παρακληθεῖσαι ἡκουσιν*, for it is an argument based on an accomplished fact, as the context shows. Again, Kleon's sneer at Nikias (4, 27, 5) becomes much more effective, if *εἰ ἄνδρες εἰεν οἱ στρατηγοί* is put back into *εἰ ἄνδρες εἰσὶν* than if we take the tamer *ἦν ἄνδρες ὥσιν*. The logical condition is the very form for personal argument (A. J. P. III 435, cf. 438). In Herodotos, 3, 28: *ἀπυγμένος εἴη* naturally represents *ἀπυγμένος ἐστί*, and Mr. Marchant, who understands Andokides so well and has edited him so well, seems to have overlooked a clear case in 1, 122: *ἔλεγε πρὸς τούτους ὥς εἰ ἐτι καὶ νῦν βουλόμην ἀποστῆναι τῆς Ἐπιδόκου θυγατρὸς, ἔτοιμος εἴη παύσασθαι με κακῶς ποιῶν.* To be sure, there is a verb of will in the sentence, and that always complicates matters, but here we may confidently resolve into the indicative. Cf. §120: *εἰ μὲν σὺ βούλει ἐπιδικάζεσθαι, ἔχε τύχην ἀγαθὴν, εἰ δὲ μή, ἐγὼ ἐπιδικάσομαι.* At all events, it will be as well to postpone the 'simplification' of which Mr. Farnell speaks until all the evidence is in.

Unfortunate in his reliance on Stahl, Mr. Marchant is not less unfortunate in his echo of Classen. In his well-known appendix to Thuk. 4, 63, 2, Classen calls the predicative use of the participle in 2, 49, 4: *μετὰ τὰτα λωφῆσαντα* and 6, 3, 3: *μετὰ Συρακούσας οἰκισθεῖσας* an experiment, forgetting that he himself had cited nearly a score of examples in his *Homerischer Sprachgebrauch*, p. 59. And then he goes on to say: "Man darf billig fragen, weshalb diese leichte Structur, die im Lateinischen zu geläufigstem Gebrauche (post, ante urbem conditam u. dgl.) gelangt ist, im Griechischen wie es scheint völlig wiederaufgegeben ist." And so Mr. Marchant (c. 2, 1): "It is strange that this use, so common in Latin, dropped out of Greek." It is common in Latin, indeed, produces the impression of being much more common in Latin than in Greek, as the predicative participle generally seems to be much more common in Latin than in Greek (see my *Pindar, Introductory Essay*, cxiii), but this impression is due, in part, to the character of the Latin authors with whom we are most familiar. See Schmalz, *Lat. Synt.*², p. 439, who traces the growth and the sphere of the construction in a way that stirs doubts as to its native Latinity. It would be too horrible if *post urbem conditam* were a Grecism, as Milton's 'since created man' is a Latinism. But when did the construction drop out? It seems to be grounded in the language. We have found it in Homer. It is familiar in Herodotos, who says *μετὰ Σόλωνά οἰχόμενον* (1, 34) with the same easy grace that he says *ἅμα κινῶνι ἐκδυομένῳ* (1, 8). Antiphon says, 5, 35: *τὸν μὲν ἔλεγχον τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπεστέρει δι' αὐτοῦ τοῦ σώματος ἀπολλυ-*

μένον, where Blass makes himself unnecessarily unhappy. Lysias 4, 10, whether Lysias or Pseudo-Lysias, has a construction that matches Antiphon's: ἐξὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρώπου βασανισθείσης τὸν ἐλεγχον ποιήσασθαι. Plato, Symp. 198 B, cited by Goodwin, M. and T., §829 b, is not a convincing example, but 183 E is not to be impugned: ἅμα τῷ τοῦ σώματος ἀνθεὶ λήγοντι (cf. Tim. 37 E). Poor Xenophon is put out of court, as usual, with his σύν τῷ φόβῳ λήγοντι (Cyr. 4, 5, 21) and the rest of his σύν's. But we cannot get rid of Demosthenes so easily, who says, 18, 57: ἀπὸ τούτων ἐξεταζομένων εὖρεθήσεται, even if some editors, not always the best, forsake Σ in §32 and read διὰ τούτους τοὺς οὐχὶ πεισθέντας instead of διὰ τούτους οὐχὶ πεισθέντας, where see Voemel. Mr. Marchant counts ἐπὶ with gen. and part., under 2, 2, 1, and it is found in 5, 25, 1 also, but not in the passages cited by Kühner, II 430. It is familiar in Herodotos (1, 15, 65 and elsewhere). It is, in fact, a well-known legal formula and has not dropped out of Attic inscriptions any more than it has dropped out of Aristophanes, who has it, Ach. 67: ἐπ' Εὐθυμένους ἄρχοντας. The principle is the same whether ἄρχοντας is used as a substantive or not. As for μετὰ, which is the special experiment, we find Isai. 8, 43: μετ' Εὐκλείδην ἄρχοντα (cf. Dem. 24, 134). But the matter is not worth pressing, except so far as it emphasizes the pious wish that we had a syntactical catena to bind the hands of grammatical mischief-makers.

Among other matters, the inevitable μή for οὐ comes up in c. 17, 2: τὸ μαντεῖον προῖδει μὴ ἐπ' ἀγαθῷ ποτε αὐτὸ κατοικισθησόμενον, and we are told by Mr. Marchant that "after οἶδα the regular negative is οὐ," and that "This μή cannot be explained by any distinction in sense, and is probably a colloquial license." If he had said an 'oracular license' he would have been nearer the mark, for μή may be called the oracular negative, and the participle follows the analogy of the infinitive. To foreknow is a manner of foreordainment, and the transition is easily understood. Comp. Herod. 6, 66 (of an oracle): ἐκρινε μὴ 'Αρίστανος εἶναι Δημάρhton παῖδα (A. J. P. XII 388), and the solemn words of Dem. 6, 10: κέκρισθε γὰρ ἐκ τούτων τῶν ἔργων μόνου τῶν πάντων μηδενὸς ἀν κέρδους τὰ κοινὰ δίκαια τῶν Ἑλλήνων προέσθαι. It is a verdict, and carries with it a binding force. For another μή with participle after οἶδα see Thuc. 1, 76, 1: εὐ ἴσμεν μὴ ἂν ἦσσαν ὑμᾶς λυπηροὺς γενομένους, which goes back to the principle laid down A. J. P. I 48 (comp. Morris's note) and which may be rendered 'we dare swear (from what we know),' or, as Mr. Cook-Wilson renders it, 'we warrant you'—a translation which helps us to understand the oracular case also. It is a manner of πίστωσης, and follows πιστεύω. See also Jebb on Oed. C. 656, and Humphreys on Antig. 1064. To understand οὐ and μή a certain mobility is necessary, and particular and generic are often poor formulae. In the fresh period of the language a μὴ of will or desire is more apt to overleap mechanical barriers than is the generic to invade the particular, and the image of *oratio recta* οὐ is not unfrequently reflected in dependent discourse to the discomfiture of will and desire. The shift is of the essence of the negative in Aryan speech.

Dr. JOWETT's *Translation of Plato* has appeared in a third edition, revised and corrected throughout (New York, Macmillan & Co.), and we are informed, with all the emphasis of a separate page, that the additions and alterations

that have been made, both in the Introductions and in the Text of this Edition, affect at least a third of the work. This will be sad news for some poor scholars—Jowett's Plato is a costly work—but good news for the world of letters, and the earlier editions will still have their value as a study in the progressive art of translation. An English classic in a certain sense Dr. Jowett's work was in its earlier form. How much better in this its third and haply final form it will serve its office of introducing the student to the mind of Plato is a matter for further consideration.

The deserved success of the *Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft*, ed. by IWAN VON MÜLLER and published by Beck of Munich, has made new editions of several of the volumes necessary, and new editions bring with them enlargements as well as corrections. Some of these new editions have been noticed in these pages, such as *Brugmann's Greek Grammar*. *Schmalz and Stolz's Latin Grammar* was expanded at the same time. Of *Christ's Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur*, a trustworthy compendium and the only recent work that covers the field from the beginning to Justinian, a second edition was soon demanded, and now we greet the completion of the second edition of the first volume, which contains the *History of Classical Philology, Hermeneutics and Criticism, Palaeography, Epigraphy, Chronology and Metrology*. This volume has not only been revised and enlarged, but in parts presents us with entirely new work. So, notably, LARFELD'S *Griechische Epigraphik*, which takes the place of HINRICHS' treatise, is an elaborate textbook, and not a mere outline. In HÜBNER'S *Römische Epigraphik* the only expansion permitted by the narrow space assigned to the treatise is in the chapter on the characters. A new edition of the first part of the fourth volume has also appeared, and BUSOLT'S admirable work, *Die griechischen Staats- u. Rechtsaltertümer*, comes out in an enlarged form. At the present rate of issue, the student of classical philology must learn to class his *Handbuch* among his periodicals, and to practise a certain philosophy as to the diminished value of back numbers.